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INTRODUCTION  
The study of political terrorism demands that research move beyond theoretically 
threadbare accounts of what happened and where, toward more rigorous scientific efforts. 
This analysis uses empirical data to determine whether or not variations in target 
selection and terrorist act characteristics exist according to terrorist group-type. This will 
provide fresh insights for scholars and policymakers into the nature of terrorism.  
An underlying theme of some important works on terrorism is that the rationality 
assumption in decision-making is as valid for terrorist tacticians as it is for the political 
leadership of nation-states.1 What seems significant here is to understand that the terrorist 
who straps pipe bombs around his or her waist and boards a bus may in fact be acting 
rationally.2 Taken one step further, this way of thinking about terrorism means that 
terrorist group activity and, in the narrower sense, terrorist group targeting practices, are 
based on much more than chance and opportunity.  
Eight Middle East terrorist group-types are crafted for this study. They are differentiated 
according to ideology, the presence or absence of a charismatic leader, and recruitment.3 
This classification scheme draws from empirical studies of groups such as George 
Habash's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Sabri al Banna's Abu Nidal 
Organization, Wadi Haddad's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special 
Operations Group, and Meir Kahane's Jewish Defense League (JDL), as well as from 
authoritative works on Middle East terrorism and "charismatic authority."4  
The dependent variable is target, while the independent and intervening variables tested 
include: political ideology, location and political events. Several theoretical propositions 
about the major roles those variables play in determining terrorist group behavior are 
explored. Those hypotheses about Middle East terrorist group-types share a set of 
interconnections that are twofold in nature. At a basic level, they serve to flesh out the 
fundamental characteristics of Middle East terrorism by group-type, moving from 
suppositions to detect differences in targeting patterns, to suppositions that help to 
provide a more complete picture about the intensity of terrorist acts (i.e., number of 
deaths, wounded, and level of property damage). At a theoretical level, those hypotheses 
furnish analytical constructs that make it possible to breathe life into the underlying 
theme of this study, namely that meaningful distinctions can be made between varieties 
of "structuralist" and "non-structuralist" Middle East terrorist group-types in terms of 
target choice.  
In the broadest sense, those group-types and hypotheses presuppose and derive from a 
Middle East terrorist group-type typology that is based on three defining characteristics: 
ideology, goals and recruitment patterns. That typology, which draws on Starr and Most's 
work on third world conflicts, can be represented as a three dimensional cube with the 
characteristics ideology, goals, and recruitment, each posited along one axis. 
Significantly, this terrorist group-type typology is functional in the sense that it can be 
used to isolate and identify patterns of terrorist group behavior that distinguishes one 
group-type from another. Another advantage of this typology is that it can accommodate 
the dissolution of terrorist group-types and the formation of new ones, in contrast to those 
typologies that classify terrorist groups according to location of incident, or the type of 
terrorist activity undertaken.5  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DEFINITION OF TERRORISM  
The theory that drives this study is conceived of as a continuum, with structuralist 
terrorist group-types at one axis and non-structuralist group-types at the other. In the case 
of Islamic and/or Arab terrorist group-types, it is proposed that the more "structuralist" a 
group-type is (i.e., the more the political struggle is viewed as one against a "world 
system" like capitalism and/or imperialism), the more emphasis it will place on 
government targets. Conversely, the more "non-structuralist" a group-type is (i.e., the 
more the political struggle is viewed as one waged against individuals), the more 
emphasis it places on civilian targets.6 It is also proposed that the influence of a 
charismatic leader ought to increase the intensity of terrorist attacks committed by groups 
that claim adherence to the prevailing social ideology of Islam or that embrace alternate 
systems like Marxism-Leninism.7 Jewish fundamentalist groups should present a 
radically different picture of terrorist group behavior. To be specific, Jewish 
fundamentalist groups should attack targets with less intensity than their Islamic 
counterparts. That is the case because Jewish fundamentalist terrorist groups operate 
predominately in so-called "friendly" areas such as Israel, the Occupied Territories and 
the United States.8  
For the purposes of this study, any of the following is considered political terrorism: the 
threat, practice or promotion of force to influence the political attitudes or policy 
dispositions of a third party and used against: non-combatants; military personnel in non-
combat or peacekeeping roles; combatants, if the aforementioned violates juridical 
principles of proportionality, military necessity and discrimination; regimes which have 
not committed egregious violations of the human rights regime that approach Nuremburg 
category crimes.9  
DATA COLLECTION  
The data base for this research was compiled from two sources: The Jerusalem Post and 
Edward Mickolus's chronology, Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events 1968-
1979. Reports of terrorism from 1 January 1978 to December 1993 were taken directly 
from that English language daily newspaper and comprise the largest portion of the data 
base. Entries from January 1968 to August 1978 for sixteen terrorist groups were taken 
from Mickolus's work.10 Known acts of "independent" state terrorism (i.e., non-reactive 
events unrelated to what some writers call "insurgent terrorism"), were excluded from the 
analysis. It follows that terrorist assaults that happened in the "security zone" in Southern 
Lebanon were excluded from the data base because, all too frequently, the fundamental 
question of whether or not a terrorist assault was really an act of state terrorism remained 
unclear.  
To ensure data compatibility between entries extracted from Mickolus's work and articles 
drawn from the Jerusalem Post, I used Mickolus's entries on terrorist assaults as a guide 
to find matching reports whenever possible for the 1968-78 period. It follows that 
descriptions of terrorist incident attributes such as numbers of dead and wounded, and 
property damage, were taken from the Jerusalem Post when available. Otherwise, data 
provided in Mickolus's accounts were used. This data set, while comprehensive, does not 
represent every terrorist assault undertaken for the period of time under consideration. 
Undoubtedly, several terrorism incidents have been omitted because of the selective 
nature of accounts for the 1968-78 period, the extremely large number of unclaimed and 
uncompleted terrorist assaults, and human error (e.g., double counting, miscoding bits of 
terrorist event information, wrongful inclusion of "terrorism" events).11  
The Jerusalem Post was chosen as the predominant centerpiece of this data base on 
Middle East terrorism for several compelling reasons. First, it provides in-depth accounts 
of terrorist assaults inextricably linked to Middle East politics that occur in the Middle 
East and throughout the world. Those reports provide descriptions, sometimes very rich, 
of the players involved, and the political context within which those terrorist assaults take 
place. Second, and equally important, Jerusalem Post accounts chronicle, in extensive 
and sustained ways, terrorist assaults that did not cause deaths, injuries or property 
damage or were otherwise thwarted. Regrettably, it is probably no exaggeration to say 
that the degree of coverage that major US and European papers devote to Middle East 
terrorism depends in large part on the physical or human devastation that occurs.  
The use of Jerusalem Post accounts raises the issue of source bias. It must be 
acknowledged that some terrorist incidents might not be reported in the Jerusalem Post 
for national security reasons, or lack of access to or interest in attacks that happened in 
other parts of the Middle East. Likewise, some newspaper accounts published elsewhere 
in the Middle East also seem to suffer from source bias, a problem that might derive from 
protracted battles between pro-Western Sunni regimes and Islamic fundamentalist 
groups. One indication of this is that many English language newspaper accounts 
describe Islamic fundamentalist terrorist assaults in very mild terms.12 Some Arabic 
language newspapers are similarly equivocal in describing those attacks.13 Such 
newspaper accounts provide insufficient coverage to be useful for this study. Therefore, it 
is essential to note that each reported attack had to fit the foregoing definition of 
terrorism before it was included in the data base. Simply put, that definition served as a 
gatekeeper; some assaults chronicled in the Jerusalem Post as "terrorist acts" were 
excluded from the data base (e.g., assaults against military personnel on active duty), 
while other assaults, (e.g., specific incidents of vandalism) with generally recognizable 
political undercurrents were put in the data base.  
CODING SCHEME AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS  
The basic structure of the coding scheme consists of: "government urban or rural targets" 
(coded "government targets"); "non-government urban or rural infrastructure targets" 
(coded "infrastructure targets"); and "civilian targets." The first category includes 
government buildings such as courthouses, military administration and recruitment 
centers, non-combatant troops such as UN and US peacekeepers, and senior military 
personnel in non-combatant roles. Other "government targets" include major political 
actors, religious figures (e.g., the Pope), heads of state, parliament members and police 
officials. The category "infrastructure" includes, but is not limited to, energy facilities, oil 
pipelines, oil tankers, television and radio stations, bridges, and highways. "Civilian 
targets" include schools, civilian hospitals, commercial airliners, commuter buses, and 
marketplaces. This scheme makes it possible to code primary and secondary targets if 
necessary, by putting together the basic framework components listed above.14  
With respect to perpetrators, an overwhelming number of terrorist events in this data base 
were carried out by groups or "proto-groups." Those attacks were either claimed by 
terrorist groups, or were attributed to them by the governments of Israel, the United 
States, other governments, or Jerusalem Post sources. In the case of "lone assassins," 
when attribution was not made by the aforementioned sources, I used "contextual 
analysis" (e.g., the presence or absence of a disclaimer of responsibility for the terrorist 
assault under consideration) to classify events as to such criteria as motivations of lone 
assailants and their links, if any, to terrorist organizations. In such cases, general 
corroboration was sought from more than one Jerusalem Post report. Other terrorism 
specialists have used "contextual analysis" to make coding decisions and probably have 
had to make similar "judgment call" decisions.15  
It is probably no exaggeration to say that military and religious events that take place in 
the Middle East or are otherwise connected with it, have profound and lasting political 
implications for terrorist groups. Accordingly, political events cited in this study include 
military and religious events such as the Six Day War, the Yom Kippur War, the 
Lebanon War, Tish B'eav, Yom Kippur, Ramadan, Passover and Rosh Hashana. Several 
measures were used to establish causal relationships between "political events" and 
terrorist group attacks. These included Jerusalem Post attribution (e.g., Jerusalem Post 
sources and/or Israeli police/military sources, attribution made by other governments), 
terrorist group claims of responsibility as reported in the Jerusalem Post, Mickolus's 
attributions, occasional attributions made by other scholars, and "contextual analysis."  
In the case of "contextual analysis" some relationships were relatively straightforward, 
such as the death of Emil Greenzweig at a "Peace Now" rally in 1983, and terrorist 
assaults happening on or a few days before Tish B'eav, Land Day, and the Balfour 
Declaration Anniversary. Others involved making connections between the terrorist event 
under consideration and widely known political events that preceded the attack. For 
example, several Americans and Germans were kidnapped in Beirut all within a few days 
in 1987, against the backdrop of articulated opposition by Arab extremists to US policy 
with respect to the prospect of West German extradition of Mohammad Hamadi to the 
United States and the emergent reality of American support for Iraq against Iran.16  
The framework of analysis involves a discussion about broad trends in the behavior and 
the influence of each independent and intervening terrorism variable under consideration. 
Specifically, the analysis involves cross-tabulation analysis where relative percentages 
and frequencies for terrorist group-types are presented along with relevant significant test 
coefficients. The Pearson chi square statistic, degrees of freedom and p values are 
presented.17 With respect to this study of Middle East terrorism, the usefulness of cross-
tabulation analysis is threefold. First, it makes it possible to determine whether or not a 
statistical association exists between terrorism variables under consideration. Second, 
because it is a presentation of observed rather than predicted values, cross-tabulation 
analysis is able to isolate and identify empirical trends in those data that will be used to 
test several hypotheses for validity. Third, cross-tabulation analysis serves as a 
springboard for more sophisticated analysis of terrorism.  
At a functional level, in the bar charts and tables that follow, the number of missing cases 
may differ for four possible reasons. First, a piece of information missing from a terrorist 
attack entry (e.g., level of property damage) would result in exclusion of that entry from 
analysis of the variable under consideration. Second, in the case of "political events" 
analysis, the category "reaction to religious events," with two terrorist assaults, was 
deleted because of conceptual overlap with the category "commemoration of religious 
holidays." In the case of the distribution of terrorist assaults by group, the group 
"Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)," with two assaults attributable to it, was removed 
because of overlap between PLA and the Palestine Liberation Organization.18 Third, 
collaborator killings were excluded from the cross-tabulation analysis because such 
attacks would skew the results. Fourth, terrorism event entries from January 1968 to 
August 1978 were excluded from the test to determine frequency by year because of the 
non-randomness associated with the way those events were extracted from Mickolus's 
compilation.  
For definition purposes, "percent" indicates the percentage of the frequency of a value, 
like "0 injury," for the total number of terrorist event entries (e.g., Figure 6., 776/1237 or 
.6273). In turn, a "valid percent" is the percentage of terrorism cases for a value, like "0 
injury," with respect to the working data set for a particular test under consideration (e.g., 
Figure 6., 776/1180 or .6576). "Cumulative Percentage," by contrast, is an aggregate 
percentage of the valid percent of a value, like "1-50 injuries," coupled with the valid 
percents of values that came before. For example, the "cum percent" of the value "1-50 
injuries" in Figure 6, is 98.2%, the sum of the valid percents 65.8% and 32.5%, taking 
"rounding off" into account. In turn, "cells with expected frequency less than 5" is a 
measure presented with some of the cross-tabulation analysis findings that describes the 
percent and number of cells with expected values of less than five observations.19 Finally, 
the minimum expected frequency figure presented with some cross-tabulation tests under 
consideration, really serves as a threshold marker for the minimum value of the chi 
square necessary to appraise, in a meaningful way, whether or not statistical associations 
exist between "terrorism variables."20  
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM  
Relative Frequency of Incidents By Year  
For the fifteen year period between 1978 and 1993, the data is comprised of 973 incidents 
of domestic, transnational, and international terrorism carried out by terrorist groups that 
either operate or originate in the Middle East and/or are bound up with Middle East 
politics. It is evident that Middle East terrorism of the sort described is characterized by 
distinct cycles of activity. That pattern is consistent with the findings of several studies.21  
With respect to the range of incidents during this period, the smallest number occurred in 
1982 when 28 attacks (2.9%) were carried out (see Figure 1). The "peak years" were 
1978, 1985, 1989 and 1993. Fifty-nine incidents (6.1%) took place in 1978, as compared 
to 1985 when 84 terrorist incidents (8.6%) were carried out. In 1989, 119 terrorist acts 
(12.2%) occurred, while 143 incidents (14.7%) took place in 1993. Clearly, there has 
been a general increase in the frequency of Middle East terrorism from 1978 to 1993.  
FIGURE 1: Relative Frequency of Middle East Terrorist Attacks by Year, 1978-
1993  
Terrorist Acts by Group-Type and Location  
A breakdown of terrorist incidents by group-type reveals which types of terrorist groups 
have carried out the greatest number of incidents between 1968 and 1993 (see Figure 2). 
The data show that ethnocentric terrorist groups carried out the largest number of acts 
with 204 incidents (18.1%) while the second largest number of acts were carried out by 
ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups with 108 incidents (9.6%). Theocentric groups 
carried out the third largest number of acts with 101 incidents (9.0%). At the other 
extreme, the fewest number of incidents were committed by ideo-ethnocentric groups 
with 19 incidents (1.7%).  
FIGURE 2: Relative Frequency of Middle East Terrorist Attacks by Group-Type, 
1968-1993  
Among Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups, theocentric groups carried out 101 acts 
(9.0%) while 92 incidents (8.2%) were attributable to theocentric charismatic groups. 
Among Jewish fundamentalist terrorist groups, 61 terrorist acts (5.4%) were attributed to 
Jewish theocentric charismatic groups while 55 incidents (4.9%) were carried out by 
Jewish theocentric groups. Terrorist incidents that were thwarted by government agencies 
or aborted by the group itself amounted to 119 incidents (10.6%). What stands out here is 
that the single, largest number of terrorist incidents were unclaimed acts: 311 (27.7%).  
FIGURE 3: Relative Frequency of Middle East Terrorist Attacks by Terrorist 
Group, 1968-1993  
If the analysis is directed toward particular terrorist groups it becomes clear which groups 
carried out the greatest and the fewest number of terrorist acts from 1968 to 1993 (see 
Figure 3). Among Arab and/or Islamic fundamentalist groups, the most prolific group 
was al-Fatah, which carried out 118 acts (15.6%). Following closely behind, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Hezbollah committed 94 acts (12.5%) 
and 88 acts (11.7%) respectively. The least dynamic group among Arab and/or Islamic 
fundamentalist groups was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special 
Operations Group (PFLP-SOG) which carried out two incidents (.3%). Other low activity 
terrorist groups include the Arab Organization of 15 May, which carried out seven acts 
(.9%), the Popular Struggle Front (PSF) which engaged in three incidents (.4%), and the 
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) which committed three incidents (.4%).  
Among Jewish terrorist organizations, the Jewish Defense League (JDL) was most active, 
having carried out 38 incidents (5.0%). The second most active organization was the JDL 
offshoot Kach, which carried out 27 incidents (3.6%). The least dynamic Jewish terrorist 
organizations include the Hasmoneans with one incident, the Lifta Gang with one 
incident, and Kahane Chai with two incidents. Again, a large number of incidents (482 or 
39%) were not claimed by or attributed to a specific group.  
An analysis of terrorist incidents by location (see Figure 4) reveals that the largest 
number of terrorist attacks took place in Israel, where 436 incidents (35.4%) occurred. 
The second largest number of incidents occurred in the Occupied Territories with 368 
incidents (29.9%). Somewhat ironically, the number of terrorist acts perpetrated by 
Middle East terrorist groups in Europe (155) (12.6%) was almost equal to the number 
that happened at other Middle East locations: 195 (15.8%). The smallest number of 
terrorist attacks took place in the United States with 59 incidents (4.8%).22  
FIGURE 4: Relative Frequency of Middle East Terrorism by Location, 1968-1993  
Terrorist Act Characteristics:  
Fatalities, Injuries, Property Damage, Target Preference  
Scholars and policy makers shared a widely held belief that terrorism does not cause 
large numbers of fatalities and injuries or a substantial amount of property damage.23 
That notion is supported by the analysis. For example, only 377 incidents (31.0%) out of 
1,215 resulted in the deaths of between one and fifty persons. In fact, eight hundred and 
thirty four incidents (68.6%) that took place between 1968 to 1993 did not cause any 
deaths (see Figure 5). Further, the number of terrorist incidents that resulted in over fifty 
deaths was only four. Those incidents constitute outlier observations, which means that 
while the sample distribution of terrorist incidents is bell shaped, those observations lie 
several standard deviations away from the mean for numbers of dead.24 Nonetheless, a 
common thread powerfully ties together those "high intensity" terrorist acts. In all four of 
those extreme outlier observations, the location of the event was at a site outside of Israel 
and the Occupied Territories.25  
FIGURE 5: Relative Frequency of Numbers of Dead in Middle East Terrorist 
Incidents, 1968-1993  
In a similar vein, terrorist attacks resulted in relatively low numbers of injured persons 
when compared to the number of people injured in incidents of other forms of political 
violence.26 For instance, only 383 incidents (32.5%) out of 1,180 resulted in injuries to 
between one and fifty persons. In fact, 776 (65.8%) incidents that happened between 
1968 and 1993 did not cause any injuries (see Figure 6). Likewise, the number of terrorist 
incidents that caused injuries to between 51 and 100 persons was only 16 (1.4%). Further 
still, only five incidents caused injuries to over one hundred people. Clearly, those results 
mirror the findings of the distribution of death rates since these five incidents took place 
outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories.27  
FIGURE 6: Relative Frequency of Injured in Middle East Terrorist Incidents, 1968-
1993  
These attacks also caused relatively low levels of property damage. There were 682 
incidents out of 1,096 (62.2%) where no property damage resulted. In 298 acts (27.2%), 
only slight damage, defined as less than or about $15,000, was caused. Moderate damage, 
defined as from about $30,000 to $100,000 was inflicted in 63 incidents (5.7%). High 
levels of damage, defined as from about $100,000 to $1 million, was inflicted in 38 
incidents (3.5%). Severe damage in excess of $1 million was caused in 15 incidents 
(1.4%) (see Figure 7).  
FIGURE 7: Levels of Property Damage Caused by Middle East Terrorist Attacks, 
1968-1993  
A breakdown of terrorist incidents by target type reveals that an overwhelming number 
were directed against civilian targets. Nine hundred and sixty-nine incidents (80.5%) out 
of 1,203 involved civilian targets as compared with 234 incidents (19.5%) that involved 
government targets. Thirty-four incidents (2.7%) involved infrastructure or multiple 
target combinations (see Figure 8).  
FIGURE 8: Relative Frequency of Middle East Terrorism Target Types, 1968-1993  
The foregoing analysis leads to several conclusions about the basic parameters of Middle 
East terrorism. First, like terrorism in other parts of the world, terrorism in the Middle 
East has a cyclical configuration. The frequency of terrorist attacks ebb and flow in 
regular patterns. Equally important, there has been a significant increase in Middle East 
terrorism between 1968 and 1993. Second, the data show that the ethnocentric group-type 
was the most dynamic in the region between 1968 and 1993. The ideo-ethnocentric 
charismatic group-type placed second, but that category was only about half as active as 
the former. An identical pattern is revealed at the group level, where the most active was 
the ethnocentric group al-Fatah, followed by an ideo-ethnocentric charismatic group, the 
PFLP.  
Third, with respect to location, the largest number of Middle East terrorist attacks took 
place in Israel, followed by the Occupied Territories which has been under Israeli control 
since the 1967 Six Day War. Equally important is the finding that Europe has been 
plagued with almost as much Middle East terrorism as other parts of the Middle East 
between 1968-1993.  
Fourth, the analysis shows that most Middle East terrorist events cause relatively few 
casualties and little property damage. While devastation rates remain low consistently, 
incidents of terrorism that are outlier observations happen outside of Israel and the 
Occupied Territories. That finding is consistent with the idea that the quality of counter-
terrorism measures affects the overall impact of terrorism. Sadly, the bleakest conclusion 
is that the widely shared conception that Middle East terrorists are bent on attacking 
civilians is true. While the degree of physical devastation remains low, terrorists favor 
assaults on civilian targets by a margin of more than 4:1 (see Figure 8).  
VARIABLE ANALYSIS  
Political Ideology and Target Selection  
This section will examine the validity of the following hypotheses that derive from the 
work of several well-known terrorism specialists:28  
Hypothesis One: Ideo-ethnocentric terrorist groups will attack government targets more 
often than ethnocentric, theocentric and Jewish theocentric terrorist groups  
Hypothesis Two: Theocentric terrorist groups will attack civilian targets more often than 
ethnocentric terrorist groups  
Analysis of the influence of group ideology on target selection indicates a statistical 
association between the political ideology of a terrorist group and the type of target 
chosen. That suggests a systematic and substantive relationship between those 
variables.29 A breakdown of the data shows that ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups had 
the highest rate of terrorist attacks directed at civilian targets: 84/108 acts (77.8%). 
Ethnocentric groups had the second highest percentage of attacks against civilian targets: 
158/204 acts (77.5%) (see Table 1). In turn, Jewish theocentric groups had the third 
highest percentage of attacks of this sort: 42/55 acts (76.4%).  
At the other extreme, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups and ideo-ethnocentric groups 
had the lowest rates of civilian target attacks. These were, 32/61 (52.5%) and 10/19 acts 
(52.6%) respectively. Ethnocentric charismatic groups had the second lowest percentage 
of attacks against civilian targets: 34/54 acts (63.0%).  
In contrast, ideo-ethnocentric groups had the highest percentage of attacks aimed at 
government targets: 9/19 acts (47.4%). Jewish theocentric charismatic groups had the 
second highest rate of attacks against government targets: 27/61 acts (44.3%). 
Ethnocentric charismatic groups had the third highest percentage of attacks of this kind: 
20/54 incidents (37.0%).  
TABLE 1: Relative Frequency of Terrorist Targets by Group-type, 1968-1993  
Attention to target types that do not fall into "civilian" or "government" categories brings 
the outlier cases into sharp focus. Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups had the largest 
percentage of attacks against infrastructure: 6/108 incidents (5.6%). Ethnocentric groups 
attacked infrastructure only 2% of the time (4/204 acts), but that was the second highest 
percentage recorded. Middle East terrorist attacks that involved multiple targets were 
even more infrequent. Jewish theocentric charismatic groups had the highest rate of 
attacks where the primary target was a government facility and a civilian target was 
secondary. Attacks of that sort accounted for a mere 3.3% (2/61) of events attributable to 
that group-type. Ethnocentric groups had the second highest rate of attacks of this kind: 
3/204 incidents (1.5%).  
Conversely, theocentric charismatic and theocentric groups had the highest percentage of 
attacks where the primary target was civilian and a government target was secondary. In 
both cases, that kind of attack accounted for a mere 1% of the total number of events for 
each group-type. Finally, ethnocentric groups were the only type to engage in attacks 
where the primary target was civilian and the secondary target was infrastructure. Attacks 
of that sort accounted for only .5% (one incident) of all incidents carried out by 
ethnocentric groups.  
There were a considerable number of uncompleted and unclaimed terrorist attacks against 
civilian targets. In the case of uncompleted acts, 82/115 incidents (71.3%) involved 
civilian targets, while 27/115 acts (23.5%) involved government targets. For unclaimed 
acts, the rate was even higher: 279/311 attacks (89.7%) aimed at civilian targets, while 
only 29/311 (9.3%) were aimed at government targets. Clearly, that pattern is consistent 
with the demonstrated preference for civilian targets by the other group-types under 
consideration.  
The foregoing evidence and analysis supports the first hypothesis. I found that ideo-
ethnocentric terrorist groups attacked government targets 47.4% of the time, and 
ethnocentric, theocentric and Jewish theocentric groups only attacked government targets 
in 18.6%, 26.7% and 20.0% of attacks, respectively. In contrast, the findings do not 
support hypothesis two. Theocentric terrorist groups carried out 72.3% of attacks against 
civilian targets, but ethnocentric terrorist groups carried out 77.5% of attacks against 
civilian targets.  
One standout finding of the analysis is that nearly 90% (279/311) of unclaimed incidents 
were directed against civilian targets. Unclaimed acts accounted for 27.8% (311/1,120) of 
the total, making it the single, largest category of terrorist acts. It is possible to 
extrapolate from those findings and suggest that in the absence of accountability, the rate 
of terrorist group civilian target attacks will increase. Those data suggest that if the cause 
and underlying themes of a political struggle and the goals of both sides are sufficiently 
clear, it may be in the interest of a terrorist group to engage in some degree of anonymous 
activity, provided there are other terrorist groups active in the political fray.30  
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND NUMBERS OF DEAD  
The major aim of this analysis is to test the following hypothesis:31  
Hypothesis Three: Theocentric terrorist groups will have a higher percentage of 
terrorist acts that cause deaths than acts committed by ethnocentric and ideo-
ethnocentric terrorist groups. 
The significance testing indicates a statistical association between the political ideology 
of a terrorist group and numbers of deaths sustained in a terrorist attack.32 Theocentric 
groups had the highest percentage of incidents in which one to fifty persons were killed: 
55/96 acts (57.3%). Ethnocentric charismatic groups ranked second in that category: 
30/54 incidents (55.6%). By comparison, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups had the 
lowest rate: 3/61 (4.9%).33 The latter also had the highest number of non-lethal incidents: 
58/61 (95.1%). Jewish (non-charismatic) theocentric groups were responsible for the 
second highest total of non-lethal events: 47/53 (88.7%).  
One notable statistic is that over 87.7% of unclaimed incidents (271/309) caused no loss 
of life. Some 12.0% of all unclaimed acts (37) caused the deaths of between one and fifty 
people. Those findings are consistent with the idea that many unclaimed acts are rather 
"unspectacular," involving smaller explosive devices and other weapons capable of only 
low-level damage.34  
Hypothesis three is supported by the results, which found that 57.3% of theocentric group 
attacks caused the deaths of between one and fifty people. In contrast, 35.2% of attacks 
by ethnocentric terrorist groups and 47.1% of attacks by ideo-ethnocentric terrorist 
groups caused deaths in that same range. What also is significant is that Jewish groups 
acted differently than other terrorists. Since an overwhelming amount of Jewish terrorism 
happened in Israel, the Occupied Territories and the United States, and the relative 
frequency figures were so low, those findings probably reflect the fact that they operated 
predominantly in "friendly" areas.35  
Interpreting those findings further may suggest that leaders of those organizations 
refrained from overly bloody assaults in part because they saw their groups, to use Bruce 
Hoffman's phrase, as "political pressure groups" that could have some effect on the 
political process and public policy outcomes.36 It is not unreasonable to extrapolate from 
this and surmise that Jewish theocentric terrorist groups in Israel also viewed low-level 
violence as necessary for effective participation in the political system.37  
Rabbi Meir Kahane's comments about the role that violence plays within the context of 
the Jewish religious and historical experience and JDL activity in the US during the early 
1970's provides insight into this way of thinking. Kahane said, "The Jewish concept of 
violence is that it's a bad thing - but sometimes necessary. I can bring in a hundred 
quotes. And not just quotes but events in Jewish history. Innocent people should never be 
harmed. The Jewish concept is that no one pays for the sins of anyone else."38 The 
emergent reality is that the exceptions to this are the Jewish extremists, such as those who 
live in Hebron, who often subject Palestinians to intimidation and the use of force. In 
fact, the threat, use, or promotion of force by Jewish extremists in the Occupied 
Territories is entirely consistent with the definition of terrorism used in thus study.  
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND NUMBERS OF INJURIES  
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the following hypothesis:39  
Hypothesis Four: Theocentric terrorist groups will have a higher percentage of 
terrorist acts that cause injuries than acts committed by ethnocentric and ideo-
ethnocentric groups 
There is a statistical association between the political ideology of a terrorist group and 
numbers of injuries that are caused in terrorist attacks. That finding indicates that those 
variables are statistically correlated.40 Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups and 
ethnocentric groups were responsible for the highest percentages of events in which one 
to fifty persons were hurt: 51/102 incidents (50%), and 97/196 acts (49.5%) respectively. 
Alternately, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups carried out the fewest attacks in the 1-
50 injury range: 4/59 (6.8%).41  
Ideo-ethnocentric groups had the highest percentage of incidents in which between fifty-
one and one hundred persons were injured: 2/17 (11.8%). Ethnocentric charismatic 
groups were second in that category: 3/52 events (5.8%). The extreme outlier cases for 
numbers of injured were discussed earlier in this article, but it is important to note here 
that only two theocentric incidents involved injuries to more than fifty people. Therefore, 
the breakdown by group-type presented here is consistent with the idea that terrorism in 
the Middle East produces relatively low numbers of dead and wounded.  
At the other extreme, Jewish theocentric charismatic groups recorded the highest 
percentage of acts in which no injuries occurred: 55/59 (93.2%). Jewish theocentric 
groups were second: 41/52 incidents (78.8%). Likewise, nearly 67% of unclaimed acts 
(204/306) caused no injuries. Thus, only one-third of unclaimed acts (102/306) injured 
anyone at all.  
It is clear that hypothesis four is not supported by the analysis. Ethnocentric terrorist 
groups caused injuries in 52.1% of attacks while theocentric and ideo-ethnocentric groups 
caused injuries in only 41.1% and 41.2% of attacks, respectively.42 At the same time, the 
findings about unclaimed terrorist acts are tantalizing. Clearly, injury and death rates are 
consistently low for acts perpetrated by anonymous groups, "lone operatives" and Jewish 
fundamentalist groups, suggesting that anonymous acts and acts carried out by Jewish 
terrorist groups perform a similar function. It seems plausible that unclaimed terrorist acts 
may introduce substantial pressure into the political system in much the same way it was 
suggested that many Jewish fundamentalist terrorist acts did. After all, the raison d'etre of 
unclaimed terrorist assaults is to remind the ruling elite of the need for substantive 
change.43  
Political Ideology and Property Damage  
The aim of this section is to test the theoretical proposition that there is a 
relationship between the political ideology of a terrorist group and property 
damage. The hypothesis below makes it possible to measure that relationship 
empirically:44  
Hypothesis Five: Ideo-ethnocentric terrorist groups will commit acts that result in 
greater amounts of property damage than acts committed by ethnocentric and 
theocentric terrorist groups 
Based on the statistical association observed, the analysis indicates that there is a 
substantive relationship between those two variables.45 Jewish theocentric charismatic 
groups had the highest percentage of incidents in which slight damage resulted: 34/58 
(58.6%). Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups were second with 40/99 incidents 
(40.4%). Overall, terrorist attacks which caused only slight damage accounted for 30.1% 
(297/988) of the total number.  
Terrorist incidents in which moderate damage was caused numbered 63/988 (6.4%). In 
this category, ideo-ethnocentric groups had the highest percentage: 2/15 (13.3%). 
Theocentric charismatic groups were next, with 10/83 incidents (12.%). By comparison, 
high and severe levels of property damage caused by Middle East terrorist assaults were 
very infrequent. Only 38/988 acts (3.8%) caused high levels of property damage. Ideo-
ethnocentric groups had the greatest percentage of incidents that caused high levels of 
property damage: 4/15 (26.7%). Terrorist attacks that caused severe damage were 
extreme outlier cases that only made up 1.5% (15/988) of the total. Ideo-ethnocentric 
charismatic groups had the highest rate of attacks of this kind: 6/99 (6.1%).46  
At the other extreme, theocentric charismatic groups carried out the largest percentage of 
incidents in which no property damage occurred: 53/83 (63.9%). Jewish theocentric 
groups had an almost identical rate: 31/51 (60.8%). Anonymous terrorist assaults were 
almost as likely not to inflict property damage. No property damage occurred in 158/272 
unclaimed acts (58.1%). In the case of anonymous terrorist assaults, when property 
damage did happen, the damage was slight nearly one-third of the time.47  
Those findings about ideo-ethnocentric terrorist groups are the expected results. Nearly 
three-quarters of the acts they committed caused some type of property damage; 
somewhat more than one-quarter of those caused high levels of damage. Ethnocentric 
charismatic groups came in a very distant second with 4/44 acts (9.1%). Moreover, that 
pattern is very similar for other property damage categories. Clearly, those findings are 
consistent with the underlying theme that Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups in the Middle 
East devote special attention to property destruction.  
Location and Target Selection  
This study next explores the theoretical proposition that a relationship exists 
between the location of an event and target type:48  
Hypothesis Six: Terrorist attacks in Israel will have the highest percentage of 
attacks aimed at civilian targets while terrorist attacks in the Occupied Territories 
will have the second highest percentage of attacks aimed at civilian targets 
Location is the fourth independent variable that is statistically associated with target type. 
The analysis suggests a substantive and systematic relationship between those variables.49 
The analysis reveals that the Occupied Territories ranked first in attacks against civilian 
targets: 336/367 (91.6%). Israel ranked a close second: 389/433 (89.8%). European states 
came in a distant third: 106/155 (68.4%). That ranking order is reversed for government 
targets of terrorist assaults. The smallest percentage of attacks against government targets 
was in the Occupied Territories: 29/367 (7.9%). Israel experienced a few more: 36/433 
(8.3%). European states had the highest rate: 45/155 events (29.0%) (see Table 2).  
With respect to other target types, infrastructure was attacked in 6/195 acts (3.1%) in the 
Middle East outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Israel ranked second: 7/433 
(1.6%) and European states ranked third: 2/155 acts (1.3%). Terrorist attacks that 
involved multiple targets were extreme outlier observations. What stands out however is 
that the United States ranked first in attacks that involved multiple targets: 4/59 acts 
(6.8%).  
Those findings are inconsistent with hypothesis six. In fact, they reversed the order 
suggested in the hypothesis. Nonetheless, the difference between those values is small. 
Presumably, this reflects some small difference in anti-terrorist security measures and/or 
effectiveness, or indicates that the attack rates are virtually the same in both locations.  
POLITICAL EVENTS AND TARGET SELECTION  
One fundamental question that has been relatively neglected by researchers is whether or 
not a connection exists between Middle East terrorism and political events that take place 
in the region or are otherwise connected to it. In other words, does terrorism in the 
Middle East happen largely in response to political activity or is terrorism comprised 
mostly of "independent" events?  
The idea that terrorism may be largely a reactive rather than a proactive endeavor is 
based on Brecher and James' model of political violence in the Middle East.50 The 
following hypothesis captures the substance of that model:  
Hypothesis Seven: Most terrorist activity will be linked to political events in the 
region such as wars, visits by major political figures, diplomatic initiatives, the 
commemoration of religious and secular events and counter-terrorism activity 
TABLE 2: Relative Frequency of Target Type by Location, 1968-1993  
The analysis indicates there is a statistical association between the intervening variable 
(political events) and the type of target selected. Specifically, those findings mean that 
when terrorism is linked to political events, there is a statistical association between the 
type of political event that occurs and the target type that is chosen.51  
TABLE 3: Relative Frequency of Target Type by Political Event, 1968-1993  
However, a complete breakdown of the data makes it clear that most terrorist incidents 
were unrelated to political events. Incidents that had no relationship to political events 
comprised the largest proportion of the total: 859/1208 (71.1%). Of those 859 incidents, 
684 (79.6%) were directed at civilian targets (see Table 3).  
The remaining categories of "political events" are comprised of outlier observations. The 
largest of those categories (82) (6.8% of the total) consists of terrorist events that 
occurred in response to major political events, such as diplomatic initiatives. While such 
attacks formed the bulk of the outlier cases, they were not characterized by an especially 
sharp focus against the general population. Only about three-quarters of those attacks 
(62/82) involved civilian targets. Those findings may reflect the largely "symbolic" 
nature of those attacks, which were launched in protest against particular political 
initiatives.  
Terrorist activity undertaken in response to government policy at the national level, such 
as Israeli support for the Lebanese militia in southern Lebanon, formed the second largest 
group of outlier observations. While over half of those attacks (38/66) (57.6%) involved 
civilian targets, 39.4% involved government targets. That figure represents the highest 
number of "reactive" terrorist assaults against government targets. Attacks in 
commemoration of landmark events, such as the anniversary of the Sabra/Shatilla 
massacre, comprised the third largest outlier category, but that was only 3.4% of the total. 
However, these attacks yielded the second highest rate of attack against civilians: 38/41 
incidents (92.7%).  
By comparison, terrorist actions in reaction to war and government counter-terrorist 
assassinations, were very rare occurrences. Terrorist attacks undertaken in reaction to war 
only comprised .2% of 1,208 acts and always involved civilian targets (2/2 acts). 
Terrorist incidents committed in reaction to counter-terrorist assassinations amounted to 
only .7% of the total. Those attacks had the highest percentage of assaults against 
infrastructure: 1/8 (12.5%). In turn, terrorist incidents carried out in commemoration of 
religious holidays had the second highest percentage (4.5%) of attacks against 
infrastructure, but that was only one incident. Likewise, terrorist attacks undertaken to 
commemorate secular holidays had the highest percentage (5.9%) of attacks against 
multiple targets, but again this involved only a single event.  
Clearly, the results of the analysis are inconsistent with hypothesis nine and as a result, 
that hypothesis is rejected. At the same time, the analysis suggests that proactive 
activities carried out by government agencies may elicit terrorist responses that resonate 
with similar thematic emphases. For example, "symbolic" political initiatives seemed to 
be matched by "symbolic" terrorist activity. Similarly, the analysis shows that 
government policy outputs evoked the highest number of "reactive" terrorist attacks 
aimed at government targets.  
The analysis also suggests that events that exert a powerful pull on visceral emotions, 
such as the commemoration of landmark events, prompted terrorist attacks that focused 
greater attention on civilian targets. Likewise, violent government activity that affected 
large numbers of people directly, perhaps even profoundly, elicited terrorist attacks that 
matched the fundamentally invasive and thereby "intimate" nature of those government 
activities with equivalent intensity against civilians. For example, 86.7% of attacks in 
reaction to air-strikes involved civilian targets, while 93.3% and 100% of attacks in 
reaction to ground attacks and war respectively, involved civilian targets.  
CONCLUSIONS  
General Trends  
Cross-tabulation analysis provides valuable insight into understanding Middle East 
terrorism by revealing its broader characteristics and variations according to group-type. 
At the most basic level, the analysis reveals that while there has been a general increase 
in Middle East terrorism in absolute terms since 1968, the frequency of Middle East 
terrorism ebbs and flows in a cyclical configuration.  
Another rudimentary finding concerns where Middle East terrorism takes place. While an 
overwhelming number of terrorist incidents happened in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories, European nations were afflicted nearly as much as Middle East locations 
outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories.  
The analysis shows that ethnocentric groups were the most dynamic type of group 
between 1968-1993. Ethnocentric groups carried out 204 acts of terrorism during that 
period. Ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups were the second most active type of group, 
carrying out 108 acts. However, the largest number of acts were committed by 
anonymous terrorist organizations or "lone operatives." Unknown groups or "lone 
operatives" launched over 300 acts between 1968 and 1993. When the analysis is focused 
at the group level, similar trends in the data are discernable. For example, al-Fatah carried 
out the highest number of terrorist acts (118) followed by 94 acts credited to the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  
The widely shared belief that terrorists focus primary attention against civilians in pursuit 
of political goals is supported by the results. When all locations are included in the 
analysis, Middle East terrorists favored attacks against civilian targets by a margin of 
over 4:1. When the locations Israel and the Occupied Territories are examined separately, 
that ratio increased to approximately 10:1 (see Figure 8 and Table 2). Irrespective of 
location, however, the results indicate that in addition to a focus on civilian targets, 
terrorist assaults linked to the Middle East remained relatively straightforward operations 
that usually involved one target. Incidents involving multiple targets were extremely rare 
occurrences that comprised only some 1% of all terrorist incidents (see Table 1).  
What degree of damage does Middle East terrorism cause? The analysis shows that the 
costs of Middle East terrorism, if measured in purely physical terms have been low. The 
sample mean for numbers of dead is 1.454 and the sample mean for numbers of injured is 
4.639.52 Comparable low levels of property damage from Middle East terrorist assaults 
were recorded. More than half of all incidents caused no property damage, and less than 
4% resulted in high levels of property damage.  
The Role of Political Ideology  
How do these data support the theoretical framework described at the start? The 
continuum for non-structuralist and structuralist terrorist group-types is presented and 
overlaid with data on non-charismatic group-types and target-type with good results (see 
Figure 9):  
FIGURE 9: Continuum of 'Structuralist' and 'Non-Structuralist' Middle East 
Terrorist Group-Tpes for Non-charismatic Group-types and Target (Jewish 
Fundamentalist Terrorist Group-types Excluded)  
Political ideology is found to be influential in terms of what type of target was chosen. 
The analysis determines that ideo-ethnocentric terrorist groups attacked government 
targets more often than ethnocentric and theocentric groups, as well as Jewish theocentric 
terrorist groups. This finding strongly supports the notion that "structuralist" Middle East 
terrorist groups carry out terrorist attacks that place more emphasis on government 
targets.  
At the same time, the analysis reveals that ethnocentric terrorist groups attacked civilian 
targets more frequently than theocentric groups. At the start, I believed that Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist groups and nationalist-irredentist groups were both "non-
structuralist" in nature.53 These findings, however, seem to suggest that theocentric 
groups, while less "structuralist" than "Marxist-Leninist" groups, are more "structuralist" 
than ethnocentric groups. At a theoretical level, that approach seems justifiable since 
Islamic fundamentalism not only focuses heavily on an individual's declared loyalties and 
beliefs, but is "structuralist" in the sense that it perceives the world as essentially divided 
up between an Islamic East and hordes of "unbelievers" under the control of a Christian 
West.54  
The analysis of terrorism "attribute" variables is less supportive of the theory that drives 
this work. Having said that, location as an explanatory variable may not only explain why 
Jewish terrorism remains consistently low in terms of intensity, but seems to explain, 
inter-alia, why death rates for ethnocentric groups, clearly a "deviant finding," seem to be 
muted.  
In the case of ethnocentric groups, the death rate is comparatively low. One possible 
explanation for that finding is that a full 42.9% of ethnocentric attacks took place in 
Israel, while only 13.9% of theocentric attacks happened in Israel. Ethnocentric group-
type death rates are likely influenced by that distribution. Ethnocentric group-type death 
rates may be low because of two factors that work alone or in tandem. At a functional 
level, Israeli counter-terrorism measures may make terrorist assaults with very high death 
rates difficult to carry out. At a political level, ethnocentric groups are the type of terrorist 
group most interested in a political settlement with Israel. If ethnocentric assaults crossed 
a threshold of "acceptable" numbers of deaths, they would have elicited the looming 
catastrophe of decisive Israeli retaliation that would have more than offset any political 
gains made.55  
Location  
Seen from another angle, the cross-tabulation results also indicate that location of the 
terrorist assault heavily influences the target selection process. Terrorist attacks in the 
Occupied Territories had the highest percentage of attacks against civilian targets, while 
attacks in Israel had the second highest rate. The European states placed a distant third. 
While those first and second place rankings are not the expected findings, the results are 
consistent with the idea that the frequency of attacks involving civilians in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories is greater than in other locations. Moreover, while those findings are 
inconsistent with hypothesis six, the difference in attack frequency rates between 
locations is very small. As mentioned previously, those findings either reflect some small 
difference in anti-terrorism measures or their implementation, or suggest that attack rates 
are basically the same in both locations.  
Charismatic Leadership: Impact on Islamic Fundamentalist,  
Marxist-Leninist and National-Irredentist Terrorist Groups  
One of the underlying themes of this study is that charismatic leaders of Arab/Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist groups influence terrorist group behavior. While the data support 
that idea in some cases, many of the results do not conform with predictions made earlier 
in this study. The following is a summary of the findings about charismatic leadership for 
Islamic fundamentalist, Marxist-Leninist and nationalist-irredentist terrorist groups.  
FIGURE 10: Continuum of 'Structuralist' and 'Non-Structuralist' Middle East 
Terrorist Group-Types and Target (Jewish Fundamentalist Terrorist Group-types 
Excluded)  
The data suggest the presence of a charismatic leader at the helm of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist groups makes little difference in terms of target selection and 
intensity of attack. For example, while theocentric charismatic groups attacked civilian 
targets in 72.8% of all attacks, theocentric groups did so in 72.3% of attacks. With 
respect to intensity of attacks, the observed data show that while a lower percentage of 
theocentric charismatic group attacks killed between one and fifty persons, a higher 
percentage of theocentric charismatic attacks injured between one and fifty persons. What 
seems significant here is the connection between numbers of deaths in terrorist assaults 
and location as an explanatory variable. A full 36% of theocentric charismatic attacks 
took place in Israel and the data show that only 29.2% of theocentric charismatic attacks 
killed between one and fifty persons. By contrast, only 13.9% of theocentric attacks took 
place in Israel and 57.3% of theocentric attacks killed between one and fifty persons.56  
The analysis fails to reveal any pattern in terms of property damage levels caused by 
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist assaults. For example, while theocentric and theocentric 
charismatic groups had the same percentage of attacks that caused high amounts of 
property damage, theocentric groups had a much higher percentage of attacks that caused 
slight damage, whereas theocentric charismatic groups had a much higher percentage that 
caused moderate damage. Interestingly enough, the results suggest location is not an 
explanatory variable for lower amounts of property damage. For example, with over one-
third of theocentric charismatic attacks in Israel, a full 12% of them caused moderate 
property damage. That figure is nearly three times greater than the amount for theocentric 
groups (4.7%), which attacked targets in Israel only 13.9% of the time.57  
In the case of Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups, the data generally support the proposition 
that groups led by a charismatic leader commit terrorist acts that more closely resemble 
incidents carried out by other types of groups calling for a Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic 
Middle East. The strongest evidence of a link between an increase in violence against the 
general population and the presence of a charismatic leader is found in the analysis of 
target choice. A breakdown of the data reveals that while ideo-ethnocentric group attacks 
involved civilian targets in nearly 53% of all incidents, close to 78% of ideo-ethnocentric 
charismatic group attacks were directed at civilian targets.  
Analysis of the intensity of terrorist incidents carried out by ideo-ethnocentric and ideo-
ethnocentric charismatic groups seems to be, prime facie, less supportive of that 
relationship. For example, the data show that a greater percentage of ideo-ethnocentric 
group attacks killed between one and fifty persons than ideo-ethnocentric charismatic 
attacks. Meanwhile, ideo-ethnocentric charismatic groups had a much higher percentage 
of attacks that wounded between one and fifty persons than did ideo-ethnocentric groups. 
However, analysis of location and group type suggests location as an explanatory 
variable. While nearly two thirds of all ideo-ethnocentric charismatic group attacks took 
place in Israel and the Occupied Territories, there were no attacks by ideo-ethnocentric 
groups in those locales. In fact, analysis shows that nearly 58% of all ideo-ethnocentric 
attacks were carried out in other Middle East countries like Syria and Lebanon. The 
remaining 42% of ideo-ethnocentric assaults took place in Europe.58  
In the case of nationalist-irredentist terrorist groups, the data suggest the presence of a 
charismatic leader has an influence on target type and intensity, although that influence is 
different for each. It is observed that ethnocentric terrorist groups carry out civilian target 
attacks (77.5%) more frequently than ethnocentric charismatic groups (63.0%). For 
ethnocentric charismatic groups, the roughly "60-40" split between civilian and 
government targets mirrors the Abu Nidal Organization's seemingly more balanced 
targeting of civilian and government targets.59  
With respect to intensity, however, nearly 56% of ethnocentric charismatic group attacks 
killed between one and fifty persons as compared to 35.2% for ethnocentric groups. 
Likewise, nearly 54% of ethnocentric charismatic attacks caused injuries to between one 
and fifty persons as compared to slightly less than 50% for ethnocentric groups. Once 
again, location seems to be the explanatory variable for the different findings about target 
choice and terrorist assault intensity. Very few ethnocentric charismatic attacks took 
place in Israel (4/54) (7.4%), while 42.9% of ethnocentric attacks happened in Israel.60  
The Behavioral Patterns of Jewish Fundamentalist Terrorist Groups  
One of the cornerstones of the theory that drives this study is that Jewish fundamentalist 
terrorist groups ought to attack targets with less intensity than their Islamic counterparts. 
The results of the analysis about the characteristics of "Jewish terror" strongly support 
that idea.61 Specifically, the data show that Jewish theocentric charismatic groups had the 
highest percentage of non-lethal incidents, while Jewish theocentric groups had the 
second highest amount. The analysis also reveals that Jewish theocentric charismatic 
groups had the highest percentage of injury-free attacks while Jewish theocentric groups 
came in second place. Finally, it is observed that neither Jewish theocentric charismatic 
nor Jewish theocentric groups committed acts that caused high amounts of property 
damage. In fact, only around two percent of all acts for both group-types resulted in even 
moderate amounts of damage. To be sure, some 93% of Jewish theocentric charismatic 
attacks happened in the "friendly" areas of Israel, The Occupied Territories and the 
United States. Indeed, a full 100% of Jewish theocentric attacks happened in Israel and 
The Occupied Territories alone.62  
The data suggest that the reason for this self-styled restraint by Jewish fundamentalist 
terrorist groups is twofold. At one level, it seems obvious that the restraint shown served 
to prevent a crackdown by Israel's General Security Service. At another level, those 
findings suggest that leaders of those organizations refrained from undertaking 
devastating assaults on a consistent basis because they viewed their groups, to use 
Hoffman's expression, as "political pressure groups" that could influence the Israeli 
and/or American political systems.63 Furthermore, those findings suggest that systemic or 
structural factors (i.e., whether or not a terrorist group is "indigenous" or "exogenous" to 
the political system under attack) have significant effects on terrorist event 
characteristics.64  
The Influence of Political Events  
Middle East terrorism is found to be a largely proactive rather than a reactive 
undertaking. The analysis reveals that some 70.0% of all terrorist activity between 1968-
1993 was unrelated to political events. When terrorism was linked to political events, 
there was a statistical association between target type and political event type. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that terrorist actions taken in response to particular 
political events share similar underlying themes with them. That finding has powerful 
implications for counter-terrorism policy. If there is evidence that indicates particular 
types of political events elicit attacks that place predictable emphasis on certain kinds of 
targets, more effective counter-terrorism policy can be crafted and implemented.  
Terrorism by Anonymous Groups or "Lone Operatives"  
Terrorist attacks by anonymous groups or "lone operatives" are found to be the most 
common type of attack between 1968 and 1993. In addition, nearly 90% of all unclaimed 
attacks involved civilian targets. For terrorist assaults against civilian targets, that 
percentage figure is the highest measure recorded for any category.  
While the vast majority of unclaimed terrorist acts were aimed at the general population, 
those acts caused little damage. The percentage of anonymous terrorist assaults that 
caused at least one death or injury was comparatively low. In addition, nearly one-third of 
all anonymous attacks resulted in only a slight amount of property damage.  
What seems significant here is the findings suggest that effective counter-terrorism 
measures are largely dependent on whether or not a terrorist group is identifiable. It 
follows that a "mixed bundle" of anonymous and claimed acts of terrorism that are low 
intensity in nature may be an effective strategy for terrorist leaders if the underlying 
themes and goals of the political struggle are sufficiently clear and other terrorist groups 
are active in the political fray.65 At a more theoretical level, the findings suggest that an 
important function of anonymous terrorist activity is to remind the ruling elite of the need 
for structural political change or accommodation.  
Reflections  
The cross-tabulation analysis makes it clear that the targeting practices of Middle East 
terrorist groups are based on much more than chance and opportunity. In fact, that 
analysis reveals discernible and at times dramatic patterns of terrorist group targeting 
behavior when Middle East terrorist groups are broken down according to three defining 
characteristics: ideology, goals, and recruitment patterns.66 Inasmuch as those results 
begin to shed light on which types of terrorist groups commit particular types of attacks, 
the set of interconnections between political events and the actions of various types of 
terrorist groups, and what the risks of Middle East terrorism are, this research lends itself 
to predictions about the future.  
Plainly, while it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a "laundry list" of policy 
prescriptions for counter-terrorism planners, some insights about "target hardening" can 
be extrapolated from the data. First, while making efforts to generate or sustain security 
around potential civilian targets of terrorism is an ineluctable conclusion, the findings 
also suggest close attention should be devoted to potential targets on anniversaries and 
celebrations, and potential government targets when national policy directives are carried 
out.  
Second, the data indicate special attention ought to be devoted to potential government 
targets with respect to Jewish fundamentalist, and Arab nationalist-irredentist groups with 
charismatic leaders, and Marxist-Leninist nationalist-irredentist groups without them. All 
of the aforementioned suggests that counter-terrorism planners might identify and sort 
out qualitative differences in policy directives, thereby in effect helping to prepare 
counter-terrorism contingency plans for types of intensity levels in terrorist attacks that 
seem bound up with specific kinds of policy directives. Equally important, linkages 
should be made between delineated "policy types" and terrorist groups affected, to 
promote better risk assessment. Bearing in mind that some terrorist assaults occur on 
anniversaries or to commemorate events, it follows that such a classification scheme 
might isolate and identify particular time periods where implementation of specific 
"policy types" is fraught with peril because of possible "joint effects" that presuppose and 
derive from political events and policy directives.  
Third, trends in the data indicate that counter-terrorism planners should anticipate an 
overwhelming number of Middle East terrorism attacks that involve one target. What 
seems significant here however, is that counter-terrorism planners should prepare for the 
possibility of a shift in strategy, namely to attacks that involve multiple targets and 
perhaps, multiple target-type combinations. In essence, counter-terrorism planners need 
to introduce even more flexibility into the counter-terrorism system by means of 
additional resource acquisition, and enhanced organizational capacity both within and 
between government agencies, that may presuppose and derive from even more 
coordinated terrorist event and response "simulations."67  
Fourth, since Middle East terrorism comprised a very high number of anonymous 
terrorist assaults, policy-making officials might consider ways to reduce that proportion. 
Because those attacks may be associated with a political setting in which the political 
goals of the state and several terrorist groups, perceived to be "clear," are all too 
frequently couched in zero-sum terms, then at one level the question becomes how to 
"blur" the political goals of particular terrorist organization "constituency groups" under 
consideration that have articulated political demands and aspirations.68 One approach 
may be to use what David Baldwin calls "positive sanctions," aimed at terrorist group 
constituencies, to make it more difficult for them to agree on the range of tactical choices 
to endorse for terrorist groups.69 "Positive sanctions" that establish a set of 
interconnections between a state (e.g., Israel, the United States) and "constituency 
groups" might include resources for urban renewal, education, housing, and medical 
supplies for Gaza and to be sure, other locales now under the aegis of a continuously 
evolving Palestinian nation.70  
At another level, it may be in the Israeli government's interest, and in the national 
security interest of Israel, to continue "the peace process" if only for the sake of keeping 
low the number and type of terrorist groups active in the political fray.71 Compounding 
the challenge even more, it may be advantageous, in particular situations or with specific 
terrorist groups, to engage in some type of dialogue (e.g., prisoner exchange, the scope of 
prisoner health or visitation rights under consideration) if only to help reduce the 
likelihood of a solid "hardline" consensus among terrorist tacticians about terrorist group 
tactics.  
In conclusion, inasmuch as this study ties together work on terrorism and places its own 
findings within the context of a theoretical framework, this study serves as a first step 
within the realm of terrorism studies toward what Zinnes calls the "cumulative 
integration" of scholarly work.72 To be sure, those findings demonstrate it is possible to 
move beyond the "coffee table logic" of fragmented rhetorical arguments that shape 
much of what is discussed about terrorism in the Middle East. Hopefully, the basic 
structure of this research can assist others in their work, and thus contribute to efforts to 
learn more about a form of political violence that remains largely untouched by empirical 
investigation.  
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